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Wage rates reflect not only economic considerations, but also the underlying values, 
norms and structures of the societies in which they are set. Wage rates are not simply the 
product of economic factors, such as 'what the market will bear', but also perceptions of 
what is a fair and equitable distribution of rewards across workers, and between workers 
and their employers. The current debate over safety net wage adjustments (SNAs) in 
Australia raises some important issues relating to these non-economic or normative 
considerations. 
 
 SNAs were introduced to the Australian wages system in 1993 as part of the shift in 
wage determination towards enterprise bargaining (AIRC, 1993). They are currently 
available to all Award-covered workers who have been unable to access a wage increase 
via enterprise bargaining and who depend on adjustments to Award rates for their wage 
increases. Conservatively, about 25 percent of all Australian workers fall into this 
category (Peetz, 1998: 541)1.  
 
The fairness and equity issues that are raised in the debate on SNAs concern, first, the 
role played by these wage adjustments in protecting the welfare of workers at the bottom 
end of the earnings distribution. They also concern the role that SNAs play in protecting 
the relative wages of the other workers whom, for one reason or another, have not been 
able to secure a wage increase through enterprise bargaining. 
 
To date, most of the academic commentary on SNAs has focused on the effects of 
regulating the wages of workers at the bottom of the earnings ladder, largely under the 
banner of minimum wage rates (see Dawkins, 1997; Richardson 1998; Neville, 1996 and 
1997; Sloan, 1996; Valentine, 1996). Thus far, the effects of SNAs for the significant 
minority of workers who may not be ‘low paid’ but who still depend on adjustments to 
Award rates of pay for their wage increases have not been fully examined.  
 
In this paper we attempt to focus more attention on the latter issue by discussing the 
possible effects of a plan by the Federal government to restrict the scope of SNA to the 
low paid (Reith, 1999). We begin by providing a very brief outline of the history and 
current role of safety net wages, highlighting the issues that have been raised in the first 
three Living Wage cases. In Section II we also briefly describe the proposals that have 
been made by the Federal government and by some prominent economists to pare back 
SNAs and to leave the determination of wage rates to ‘market’ forces.  Section III 
                                                           
1  This estimate of the number of workers dependent on SNAs includes only those workers who are 
formally entitled to such a wage adjustment (that is, those earning Award rates of pay). An additional, large 
group of workers receive over-Award payments and wage increases based informally on the SNA (Rimmer, 
1998: 608-609).  
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examines the issues associated with these proposals, focusing, in particular, on the 
question of whether the determination of wage relativities can be safely left to market 
forces. Section IV provides a summary and conclusion. 
 
Section II Safety Net Wage Adjustments 
 
As was noted in the introduction, SNAs were introduced to the Australian wage system in 
1993 as part of a general movement towards enterprise bargaining. Despite some changes 
to their scope2, SNAs were retained by the Coalition government under the 1996 
Workplace Relations (and Other Legislation Amendment) Act 1996 (WRA Act 1996) and 
have been the focus of three 'Living Wage’ cases, the last of which was determined in 
April 1999. 
 
The Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) is responsible for establishing 
and maintaining Safety Net Wages. In performing this function the AIRC is required by 
the Act to have regard to:  
 
a) the need to provide fair minimum standards for employees in the context of 
living standards generally prevailing in the Australian community; 
b) economic factors, including levels of productivity and inflation, and the 
desirability of attaining a high level of employment;  
c) when adjusting the safety net, the needs of the low paid. 
(WRA Act 1996; Part VI, Section 88B(2)) 
 
Any SNA must also preserve the incentive for workers to engage in the process of 
enterprise bargaining (see AIRC, 1998). 
 
The Living Wage Cases 
 
The task involved in accommodating these various objectives for Safety Net Wages has 
been evident in each of the three Living Wage cases (1997-1999). Not surprisingly, the 
submissions of employers and governments to these cases have stressed the potential 
negative impact on economic activity and employment of a higher general level of wages. 
They have also expressed concern about the effects on wage relativities of SNAs, 
especially the possibility that interference with market determined relativities might 
generate structural unemployment (AIRC, 1998: 27-28). 
 
In line with these concerns, employers and governments have argued either for no or only 
limited wage increases in each of the Living Wage cases. They have also argued that if 
                                                           
2  Up until the mid 1990s SNAs were available to all workers who satisfied the test of having failed 
to receive a wage increase through enterprise bargaining. Since the passage of the WRA Act 1996 the AIRC 
has restricted SNAs to workers whose whose actual wages (including over-Award payments) were close 
(e.g. within a band of around $10) or equal to Award rates of pay (Peetz, 1998: 539). 
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any wage adjustment is awarded it should be limited to workers at the lower end of the 
earnings distribution, leaving the determination of wage relativities across occupational 
and industry groups to market forces. For example, The Joint Government3 submission to 
the most recent case proposed an $8 per week SNA to be targeted to the low paid and 
linked to the Award simplification process. In other words, the $8 would be available on 
application to minimum classification rates at or below the equivalent of the C10 (skilled 
tradesperson) rate in the Metal Industry Award- currently $465.20 per week. Award rates 
above the C10 rate would not be varied as part of the SNA process. 
 
In contrast, the submissions of the ACTU have emphasised the social function of wages 
(while at the same time refuting claims regarding the negative allocative effects of 
SNAs). According to the ACTU, the following principles should guide these wage 
adjustments: (a) the right of workers and families to a 'decent standard of living'; (b) a 
fairer and more equal distribution of economic and productivity growth, which reduces 
income inequality; (c) reference to achievements in the bargaining stream in the setting of 
Award rates; and (d) equal pay (ACTU, 1997: 2). 
 
Accordingly, the ACTU has typically argued for SNAs that match the increase in wages 
and salaries recorded in other sectors of the economy (to preserve existing levels of 
earnings equality), and for these increases to be made available to all Award employees. It 
has also argued for wage increases that compensate for cost of living changes. 
 
Some interesting submissions have also been made regarding the effects of SNAs on the 
incentives for workers and employers to engage in enterprise bargaining. Employers have 
emphasised that SNAs should be kept low to encourage workers to engage in bargaining 
with their employers. However, the ACTU has pointed out that, in the majority of cases, 
bargaining is an initiative of employers not employees and that employers will have a 
greater incentive to engage in bargaining (and to negotiate productivity improvements) if 
the SNA is large, not small (Peetz, 1998: 542). 
 
The AIRC's response to these submissions has given credence to the various arguments 
put to it. In the most recent decision (April 1999), Award rates of up to and including 
$510 per week were increased by $12 per week, whilst those above $510 were increased 
by $10. (The ACTU claim was for increases of $26.60 per week for all Award rates of 
pay up to $527.80 per week; and a 5 percent increase in Award rates of pay above that 
level (AIRC, 1999)). 
 
On the economic effects of this decision the AIRC argued that, due to the small 
contribution to aggregate wage outcomes of the SNAs, they would have only a limited 
effect on economic activity. However, the Commission did grant a lower dollar amount in 
this case than it did in the 1998 Living Wage case due to a concern about a predicted 
easing in economic growth and a 'desire not to jeopardise the emerging downward trend 
                                                           
3  The Joint Government Submission was comprised of the Commonwealth Government and the 
governments of South Australia, Victoria, Western Australia, the ACT and the NT. 
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in unemployment’ (AIRC, 1999). The Commission also amended the Economic 
Incapacity Principle to take into account the possibility that some employers may not 
have the financial capacity to fund the wage increase. 
 
On the social outcomes, the AIRC expressed its concern about the rising level of earnings 
inequality in Australia, especially the growing ‘gap between the income levels established 
as a result of bargaining and those determined by the Award system’ (AIRC, 1999). Its 
decision in the 1999 Living Wage case to award an increase of $12 per week for workers 
earning less than $510 per week reflects this concern, with it being explicitly designed to 
be in line with the increase in earnings generally (ibid.). 
 
However, the Commission recognised that the $10 per week wage increase for workers 
earning more than $510 per week would not fully address the gap between the earnings of 
these SNA workers and those in the bargaining stream (although it would maintain the 
real value of their wages). This represented a compromise of the Commission’s equity 
objectives for cost considerations (ibid.). 
 
Despite this, the fact that the Commission awarded a wage increase to workers earning 
more than $510 per week at all represents an important interpretation of the social issues 
involved in the SNAs. As was noted above, employers and several governments 
submitted that the SNA should only apply to workers classified at or below the C10 rate. 
This would leave the structure of internal relativities (within each Award) subject only to 
market pressures. Workers employed above the C10 rate who were unable to secure a 
wage increase through bargaining would see their wage position erode relative both to 
workers below the C10 rate and to those workers who were able to secure increases in the 
market. The Commission rejected this submission and in doing so it asserted that fairness 
entailed not only protecting the wages of those workers at the bottom of the earnings 
ladder but also protecting the relative wage position of other workers. 
 
The AIRC’s comments on its decision in the 1997 Living Wage case (AIRC, 1997) make 
clear its interpretation of the importance of wage relativities. There it asserted that: 
 
Such relativities remain an important determinant of the fairness of the minimum 
wage structure within Awards. How can Award rates be fair if they do not properly 
reflect the relative skills, responsibilities, etc of jobs covered by the Award? If an 
Award system has to be fair, then it is no answer, as the Joint Governments suggest, 
to leave it to workplace agreements to establish appropriate relativities. 
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Proposals for Change 
 
Since the last Living Wage Case the Federal Minister for Employment, Workplace 
Relations and Small Business, The Hon. Peter Reith, has tabled his 'second wave' of 
industrial relations reforms as foreshadowed in Reith (1999).  The Workplace Relations 
Legislation Amendment (More Jobs, Better Pay) Bill 1999 (WRLA Bill 1999), which is 
currently before the Commonwealth Parliament, has a similar flavour to the Government 
submission to the last (1998) Living Wage case.  Paragraphs 88A(b and ba) of the Bill 
would repeal paragraph 88A(b) of the Act ("Awards act as a safety net of fair minimum 
wages and conditions of employment) and substitute: 
 
(b) Awards act as a safety net providing basic minimum wages and conditions of 
employment in respect of appropriate allowable Award matters to help address the 
needs of the low paid; and 
(ba) Awards do not provide for wages and conditions of employment above the safety net 
. 
(WRLA Bill 1999; Paragraph 88A, emphasis added) 
 
The Bill also would insert a new clause into the Act, Paragaph 88c 'Commission not to 
have regard to relativities within Awards' 
 
Consistent with ensuring that Awards act as a safety net providing basic minimum 
conditions of employment in respect of appropriate allowable Award matters to help 
protect the low paid, in performing its functions under this Part the Commission must 
not have regard to the maintenance of relativities between classification rates of pay 
within individual Awards. 
(WRLA Bill 1999; Paragraph 88C, emphasis added) 
 
Some prominent academic economists have also made recommendations on how future 
SNAs should be conducted (Dawkins, Freebairn, Garnaut, Keating and Richardson, 
1998). Their emphasis is very much on the allocative side, arguing that SNAs be frozen 
for four years and the low paid be compensated through the tax/social welfare system. 
The principal objective of their plan is to reduce real wage growth and, thus, 
unemployment. They note that "[e]arnings would be suppressed more for low-skilled than 
for high-skilled workers". However, this would have a positive effect on employment as 
“the unemployed are disproportionately low skilled” (ibid.). 
 
Both these proposals would further reduce the importance attached, at the regulatory level 
at least, to the social function of wages. The “Dawkins Proposal” would shift 
responsibility for the protection of the welfare of low paid workers away from the wage 
determination system to the tax and social welfare system. Both the Reith and Dawkins 
proposals would reduce the AIRC’s role in protecting the relative wages of workers. 




Section III Safety Net Adjustments and Wage Relativities 
 
Many questions are raised by these proposals for SNAs. For example, is the social 
function of wages unimportant? Can the role that has been played by minimum wage 
rates in protecting the incomes of the low paid be replaced by the taxation/welfare 
system? Can the determination of wage rates of workers other than the low-paid be safely 
left to market forces? What would be the likely effects on equity of such a change? Are 
the gains in allocative efficiency that may come from these proposed changes sufficient to 
justify the loss of fairness in the wage system? 
 
The pros and cons of using minimum wage controls to protect the welfare of low paid 
workers has been discussed extensively elsewhere (see Dawkins, 1997; Richardson 1998; 
Hancock, 1998; Neville, 1996 and 1997; Sloan, 1996; Valentine, 1996). However, the 
issue of leaving the determination of other wage rates to market forces has received less 
attention. This is somewhat surprising, given the large number of workers who would be 
affected by restricting SNAs to the C10 rate, and given that it is less than certain that 
workers who do earn above the C10 rate would be compensated through the welfare or 
tax system for any reduction in their real wages. 
 
The argument for the deregulation of wage rates (see Dawkins, 1998 for an overview) 
derive from competitive wage theory which, in very simple terms, suggests that wage 
differentials should reflect: (a) the value of different skills in the productive process and 
how these values vary across workplaces according to the demand for final goods and 
services; and (b) the cost to workers of acquiring different skills and supplying labour in 
different workplaces.  
 
This theory suggests that if wage differentials do adjust to reflect changes in, for example, 
the market value of a particular firm’s product, and if labour ‘moves’ in response to this 
price signal, then two desirable outcomes will result. First, workers will be paid a wage 
rate that reflects the market value of their contribution to the productive process. Second, 
labour will be utilised in the sectors and firms where it is most valued (i.e., allocative 
efficiency will be achieved). Lower levels of structural unemployment and higher levels 
of economic performance should flow from this. 
 
The argument against further deregulation of wage rates starts by pointing out the limited 
relevance of these theoretical models to modern labour markets. Neither the labour 
market nor most product markets are characterised by perfect competition and, given this, 
there is no guarantee that deregulation will result in a pattern of wage relativities that 
correctly signal the efficient allocation of labour, or reward workers according to their 
contribution to output. For example, textbook economics tells us that a firm with 
monopoly power in its product market could be expected to pay higher wages than a firm 
exposed to competitive pressure, regardless of the social value of the two firm’s products. 
Furthermore, employers with some degree of monopsony power may take advantage of 
their superior bargaining strength to push wages down below the value of the worker’s 
contribution (see Rubery, 1997: 356-357; Peetz, 1998: 538). 
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Further arguments against the deregulation of wage determination flow from this critique. 
First, there is a concern that the deregulation of wages will result in further increases in 
earnings inequality, both across the workforce as a whole and between male and female 
workers. The groups who are most threatened by the processes of ‘competition’ in a 
deregulated labour market are those with the poorest bargaining power and these workers 
typically already earn below average wages (Peetz, 1998: 549). Furthermore, the 
industries with the poorest record in terms of bargaining wage increases through 
enterprise agreements (that is, the health and community services, education, retail and 
hospitality industries (see Rimmer, 1998: 609)) are those with the highest concentration 
of  female workers (see CoA, 1998: 47). 
 
The record of other countries’ experience with labour market deregulation also suggests 
that there is a real risk of exacerbating earnings inequality. For example, Fortin and 
Lemieux (1997) demonstrate a clear relationship between the decline in the real value of 
the minimum wage in the United States and both rising general levels of wage inequality 
and an increase in the gender earnings gap. Cross-country studies also point to a 
significant inverse relationship between the degree of centralisation of wage-setting and 
wage dispersion (Borland and Woodbridge, 1998: 20). Supporting this, empirical studies 
of the Australian system of wage determination suggest that regulation has resulted in a 
more egalitarian wage structure by improving outcomes for low-wage workers in 
particular (Norris, 1986: 199). 
 
A further social concern with the deregulation of wage relativities is whether important 
norms of wage justice will be reflected in a wage structure determined by market forces. 
Social norms of equity assert that a person's wages should be based on his or her 
contribution to output and, thus, that workers should be rewarded for their skill, 
education, training and effort and be paid according to the difficulty, complexity and 
supervisory responsibility of their job (see Kelley and Evans, 1993: 117). In line with this, 
the fairness of pay differentials (relativities) between occupations and workers is 
commonly assessed with reference to the physical characteristics of different jobs. 
Changes in wage relativities according to the vagaries of the market or worker's 
bargaining power are typically considered unfair (see Kahneman, Knetch and Thaler, 
1986). 
 
Alfred Marshall (1887: 212-213) emphasised the importance of these community 
standards of wage justice more than a hundred years ago when he asserted that: 
 
…every man who is up to the usual standard of efficiency of his trade in his own 
neighbourhood, and exerts himself honestly, ought to be paid for his work at the 
usual rate for his trade and neighbourhood; so that he may be able to live in that way 
to which he and his neighbours in his rank of life have been accustomed. And further, 
the popular notions of fairness demand that he should be paid this rate ungrudgingly; 
that his time should not be taken up in fighting for it; and that he should not be 
worried by constant attempts to screw his pay down by indirect means. 
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These standards of wage justice have also been identified in a range of modern studies of 
wage setting. For example, Barbara Wootton (1962: 162) described how the maintenance 
of wage differentials is “woven as warp and woof into the texture of wage discussions”. 
She described how workers and unions couch many of their arguments for wage increases 
either in terms of changes in the content of their jobs or the ‘fairness’ of maintaining a 
particular wage level in relation to a comparable group of workers. Employers also rely 
heavily on wage comparisons in their approach to wage negotiations and appear to place 
emphasis on paying wages that at least equal those of comparable employers in their local 
area (see also Ross, 1948; Piore, 1973; Hyman and Brough, 1975; Rees, 1993; Brown and 
Sisson, 1975; Dickinson, 1998; Rimmer, 1998: 615). The stability of many occupational 
wage relativities over long periods of time has also been related to the application of this 
standard of justice (see Routh, 1965; Phelps Brown, 1975). 
 
However, as Adam Smith foresaw, wage justice is not a certain outcome for all workers 
in a modern labour market. He noted that the payment of ‘just wages’ depended on there 
being virtuous, well-informed traders, prepared to limit the pursuit of their own interests 
when these interests conflict with the interests of society at large (Stabile, 1997: 298). He 
perceived that this might occur ‘naturally’ in small, well-established communities, where 
close social ties elicit emotional responses such as sympathy and, thus, encourage the 
exercise of ‘self-command’ by employers. However, in large urban centres the 
depersonalisation of social relations could lead to the dissipation of feelings of sympathy 
for other community members and, hence, “[w]ages below the natural rate might exist, 
and employers, workers and the community not know or care about it” (Stabile, 1997: 
305).  
 
To compensate for the risk of unjust wages, and to ensure that society’s interests were not 
harmed by the operations of markets, Smith formulated a role for a well-informed, 
impartial spectator. This spectator would be a moral guardian who would evaluate 
whether each individual’s actions were virtuous or not, and who would guide behaviour 
to ensure that society’s best interests were served (ibid).  
 
Thus, although Smith did have a pessimistic view of wage regulation (for example, in 
“The Wealth of Nations” Smith (1976I: 158-159) wrote: “Whenever the legislature 
attempts to regulate the differences between masters and their workmen, its counsellors 
are always the masters” and regulations are always aimed at lowering them)4, he clearly 
perceived risks in leaving the determination of wages entirely to market forces. In a 
decentralised market economy subject to the pressures of competition, employers may be 
tempted to pay wages that do not reflect agreed social values or support the long-term 
interests of their communities5 (see also Rubery, 1997: 358-359). 
                                                           
4 Nevertheless, Smith  went on to say “When the regulation… is in favour of the workmen it is 
always just and equitable”(ibid). 
 
5  A similar idea is reflected in the game theoretic literature on social norms, where it is shown that 





Finally, there are also concerns about the economic effects of further deregulation of 
wage rates. In particular, the above discussion on the importance of norms of equity 
suggests that employers may be unwillingness or unable to vary wage rates according to 
market conditions (and, thus, to provide the signals to the efficient allocation of labour). 
For example, if workers do hold to the norms of equity described above, then they may 
resist attempts to vary their wages according to market conditions. Either the predicted 
wage changes will not eventuate or productivity may go down rather than up in a 
deregulated system (see Isaac,1992: 3; Piore, 1973:378). 
 
IV Summary and Conclusion 
 
The current proposals to pare back Safety Net Wage Adjustments will limit the ability of 
the AIRC to reflect the social elements of wages in their decisions. These changes to the 
SNAs will affect the welfare of a large number of Australian workers. Restriction of the 
SNAs will leave the relative wage position of many workers subject to the influence of 
market forces and, most likely, a deterioration in earnings inequality and the gender wage 
gap will result. Given the weak bargaining position of the workers who currently depend 
on SNAs, there is a strong risk that comparative wage justice will be sacrificed for the 
promise of gains in allocative efficiency. 
 
The argument that further labour market deregulation would lead to lower levels of 
unemployment and higher levels of economic growth demands that these proposals for 
change in the SNA system be given serious consideration. However, detailed information 
is needed on the nature and size of the predicted effects on employment and productivity 
to ensure that they are large and certain enough to justify the social costs that would be 
involved.  
 
There is clearly a need for more research on the issues raised in this paper. In particular, 
more detailed information on the consequences of the proposed changes in SNAs for 
earnings inequality, and especially for the relative position of low-wage workers, is 
needed so that the social costs of these changes can be gauged. The benefits of further 
deregulation of wage fixation in terms of employment growth and economic performance 




AIRC (Australian Industrial Relations Commission) (1993) ‘Review of Wage Fixing 
Principles’, Print K9700 
AIRC (1997), ‘Safety Net Review Wages’, Print P1797 
AIRC (1998), ‘Safety Net Review Wages’, Print Q1998 
AIRC (1999),  ‘Safety Net Review Wages’, Print R1999 
ACTU (Australian Council of Trade Unions) (1997) ‘Wages 1997-2000 Resolution’, 
www.actu.asn.au/national/ about/policy 
Binmore, K. (1998), ‘A Utilitarian Theory of Political Legitimacy’, in A. Ben-Ner and L. 
Putterman (eds), Values and Institutions in Economic Analysis, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, pp.101-132 
Borland, J. and Woodbridge, G. (1998), ‘Wage Regulation, Low-Wage Workers, and 
Employment’ 
CoA (Commonwealth of Australia) (1998), Unfinished Business: Equity for Women in 
the Australian Workplace, Council for Equal Opportunity in Employment Ltd, 
Canberra 
Brown, W. and Sisson, K. (1975), ‘The Use of Comparison in Workplace Wage 
Determination’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 13, pp.23-53 
Dawkins, P. (1997), ‘The Minimum Wages Debate and Policy Developments in 
Australia, the UK and the US: An Introductory Overview’, Australian Economic 
Review, 30(2), pp.187-193 
Dawkins, P., Freebairn, J., Garnaut, R., Keating, M., and Richardson, C. (1998), ‘Dear 
John: How to Create More Jobs’, The Australian, Opinion, Monday October 26, 
p.13 
Dickinson, J. (1998), ‘The Role of Beliefs About the Fairness of Wage Differentials in 
Wage Setting: Summary of Findings’, http://snipe.ukc.ac.uk/esrc/dickrep.htm 
Fortin, N.M. and Lemieux, T. (1997), ‘Institutional Changes and Rising Wage Inequality: 
Is there a linkage?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(2), pp.75-96 
Hancock, K. (1998b), "Again, Poorest Make the Sacrifice", The Australian, Letters to the 
Editor, Tuesday October 27, p.12. 
Hyman, R. and Brough, I. (1975), Social Values and Industrial Relations: A Study of 
Fairness and Equality, Oxford, Basil Blackwell 
Isaac, J. (1992), ‘Performance Related Pay: The Importance of Fairness’, Centre for 
Industrial Relations and Labour Studies Working Paper no.64, University of 
Melbourne 
Kahneman, D., Knetch, J. and Thaler, R. (1986), ‘Fairness as a Constraint on Profit 
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market’, American Economic Review, 76(4), 
September, pp.728-741 
Kelley, J. and Evans, M. (1993), 'The Legitimation of Occupational Earnings in Nine 
Nations', American Journal of Sociology, 99 (1), July, pp. 75-125 
Marshall, A. (1887), ‘A Fair Rate of Wages’ in A.C. Pigou (ed.), Memorials of Alfred 
Marshall, Kelley and Millman, New York, 1956, pp. 212-213 
Nevile, J.W. (1996), "Minimum Wages, Equity and Unemployment’, Economics and 
Labour Relations Review, 7(2), pp.198-212 
 12
Nevile, J.W. (1997) ‘Erratum [Minimum Wages, Equity and Unemployment]’, 
Economics and Labour Relations Review, 8(1), p.177 
Norris, K. (1986), ‘The Wage Structure: Does Arbitration Make Any Difference’, in J. 
Niland (ed.), Wage Fixation in Australia, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, pp.183-201 
Peetz, D. (1998), ‘The Safety Net, Bargaining and the Role of the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission’, Journal of Industrial Relations, 40(4), December, pp 533-
554 
Phelps Brown, H. and Hopkins (1977), The Inequality of Pay, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press 
Piore, M.(1973), ‘Fragments of a Sociological Theory of Wages’, American Economic 
Review, 63(2), May,  pp. 377-384  
Reith, P., MHR, (1999), ‘The Continuing Reform of Workplace Relations: 
Implementation of “More Jobs and Better Pay”’, Implementation Discussion 
Paper, Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business, 
Canberra, May  
Richardson, S. (1998), ‘Who Gets Minimum Wages’, Journal of Industrial Relations, 
40(4), December, pp. 554-579 
Rimmer, M. (1998), ‘Enterprise Bargaining, Wage Norms and Productivity’, Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 40(4), December, pp. 580-604 
Rees, A.(1993), ‘The Role of Fairness in Wage Determination’, Journal of Labour 
Economics, 11(1), pp.243-252 
Ross, A. (1948), Trade Union Wage Policy, Berkeley, University of California Press  
Routh, G. (1965), ‘Occupations and Pay in Great Britain’, National Institute of Economic 
and Social Research, Economic and Social Studies, XIV, Cambridge University 
Press, pp.147-148 
Rubery, J. (1997), ‘Wages and the Labour Market’, British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 35(3), pp.337-366 
Sloan, J. (1996), ‘Believe it or Not; New Evidence on the Effects of Minimum Wages’, 
Agenda, 3(1), pp.121-132 
Smith, A. (1976I), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 2 vol, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press 
Stabile, D. (1997), ‘Adam Smith and the Natural Wage: Sympathy, Subsistence and 
Social Distance’, Review of Social Economy, LV (3), Fall, pp. 292-311 
Valentine, T. (1996), ‘The Minimum Wage Debate: Politically Correct Economics?’, 
Economic and Labour Relations Review, 7(2), pp.188-197 
Wootton, B. (1962), The Social Foundations of Wage Policy: A Study of Contemporary 
British Wage and Salary Structure, 2nd Edition, London: Unwin University Books 
